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1. Whether Petitioner, a citizen of the Amantonka Nation, is Indian and 
therefore not subject to special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
under the Violence Against Women Act of 2013? 
2. Whether (a) Petitioner’s court-appointed attorney, a member in good 
standing of the Amantonka Nation Bar, satisfies all legal requirements for 
court-appointed counsel, and (b) the Nation violated equal protection by 
stipulating different requirements for public defenders appointed to Indian 
defendants and non-Indian defendants, even if these differences are not 
material? 
Statement of the Case 
I. Statement of Facts 
This case is about protecting tribal sovereignty and self-government by 
permitting the Amantonka Nation (“the Nation”), a federally recognized 
tribe in the state of Rogers, to determine its own tribal enrollment policies 
and court procedures. 
Since his college graduation, Petitioner has been living and working on 
the Nation’s Reservation with his now-wife, who is a citizen of the Nation. 
R. at 6. Although Petitioner was not Indian when he met his wife, he 
                                                                                                             
 * This brief has been edited from its original form for ease of reading. The record for 
this brief comes from the 2019 National Native American Law Students Association Moot 
Court Competition problem, which can be found at: https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/ 
files/National%20NALSA%20Moot%20Court%20Problem%202019.pdf. 
 ** Chelsea Minuche and Claire Postman are both second-year law students at 
Columbia Law School. They would like to thank their friends, families, and NALSA 
teammates for their unending support. They would also like to thank the National NALSA 
board and the University of Arizona NALSA chapter for their tireless efforts to make the 
2019 NNALSA moot court competition possible. 
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applied to become a naturalized citizen of the Nation as soon as he became 
eligible. Id. 
The Nation has a “longstanding custom and tradition” of allowing 
spouses of tribal members to become citizens of the tribe, which is reflected 
in the naturalization process codified in the Amantonka Nation Code 
(“A.N.C.”). R. at 6; 3 A.N.C. §§ 201–203. Petitioner went through all the 
steps of this process, passing the Nation’s citizenship test, performing 100 
hours of community service within the Nation’s government, and 
completing courses in Amantonka culture, law, and government. R. at 6; 3 
A.N.C. § 202. Thereafter, Petitioner took an oath of citizenship and became 
an enrolled member of the tribe. R. at 6. 
Since Petitioner became an Amantonka citizen, the Nation police have 
responded to several calls to his apartment. Id. Responding to one such call 
on June 15, 2017, the police learned that Petitioner had struck his wife so 
hard that she fell on a coffee table and cracked her rib. Id. Petitioner was 
arrested and charged with assault of a partner under 5 A.N.C. § 244(b)(2). 
Id. at 6–7. 
Under 2 A.N.C. § 105, the Nation has jurisdiction to prosecute Indians 
for any violation of the A.N.C. that occurs within the boundaries of the 
Nation’s Indian Country. The Nation also has jurisdiction to prosecute non-
Indians for acts of dating or domestic violence against an Indian victim if 
the defendant has sufficient ties to the Nation. 2 A.N.C. § 105. In the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA 2013”), 
Congress expressly codified Indian tribes’ inherent authority to prosecute 
certain non-Indian abusers under special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction (“SDVCJ”). Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 
2013, Pub. L. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
1304(b)(1) (2013)). 
Upon Petitioner’s arrest, the Nation appointed him indigent defense 
counsel. R. at 4. The A.N.C. and VAWA 2013 both outline requirements 
for indigent defense counsel, although the VAWA 2013 requirements only 
apply to defendants prosecuted under SDVCJ. 2 A.N.C. § 503; 2 A.N.C. § 
607; 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c). Under the A.N.C., public 
defenders representing Indian defendants must (a) be “at least 21 years of 
age,” (2) be “of high moral character and integrity,” (3) not have been 
“dishonorably discharged from the Armed Services,” (4) be “physically 
able to carry out the duties of the office,” (5) have successfully completed 
the Amantonka bar exam, and (6) have “training in Amantonka law and 
culture.” 2 A.N.C. § 503(3); § 607(a). Public defenders representing non-
Indian defendants must (1) hold “a JD degree from an ABA accredited law 
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school,” (2) have successfully completed the Amantonka bar exam, and (3) 
have “taken the oath of office and passed a background check.” 2 A.N.C. § 
503(2); § 607 (b). 
Under VAWA 2013, defendants prosecuted under SDVCJ must be 
granted (1) “the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” and (2) “the assistance of a 
defense attorney licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United 
States that applies appropriate professional licensing standards and 
effectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its 
licensed attorneys.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c). The A.N.C. 
states that an attorney qualified to represent non-Indian defendants based on 
the three criteria above is “sufficiently qualified” to represent any defendant 
charged under SDVCJ. 2 A.N.C. § 607(b). 
Petitioner’s public defender possessed a JD degree from an ABA 
accredited law school and was a member of good standing of the 
Amantonka Nation Bar Association. R. at 7. There is no evidence or 
contention that Petitioner’s public defender committed any errors when 
representing Petitioner. Id. 
At trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of assault. R. at 5. The judge 
sentenced him to seven months of incarceration and ordered $5,300 in 
restitution, batterer rehabilitation and alcohol treatment programs, and a 
$1,500 fine. Id. 
II. Statement of Proceedings 
The Nation’s Chief Prosecutor filed domestic violence charges against 
Petitioner on June 16, 2017. R. at 3. In response, Petitioner filed three 
pretrial motions, which are also the basis for his appeal. R. at 3–7. In the 
first, he argued that the case should be dismissed because the Nation lacked 
criminal jurisdiction over him as a non-Indian. R. at 3. The Nation’s 
District Court rejected this argument because it found that Petitioner, as a 
citizen of the Nation, was Indian. Id. Second, Petitioner requested 
appointment of an attorney qualified to represent a defendant under VAWA 
2013’s SDVCJ. Id. The Nation’s District Court again rejected this argument 
because, as an Indian, Petitioner is not subject to SDVCJ. Id. Third, and 
lastly, Petitioner contended that had he been tried under SDVCJ as a non-
Indian, he would have been appointed an attorney who was a member of a 
state bar association. Id. at 3–4. He argues that this amounts to a violation 
of equal protection because the attorney appointed to him as an Indian 
defendant was not a member of a state bar association. Id. at 4. The 
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Nation’s District Court did not find that there was a violation of equal 
protection and denied this motion as well. Id. 
The jury found Petitioner guilty of domestic violence, and Petitioner 
subsequently appealed his conviction. Id. at 5–6. The Nation’s Supreme 
Court again rejected Petitioner’s arguments. Id. at 6–7. Specifically, the 
Nation’s Supreme Court held that Petitioner was properly classified as 
Indian because tribes have a right to define their own membership. Id. at 7. 
Because Petitioner completed the process of becoming an Amantonka 
Nation citizen, the Court reasoned that he is Indian. Id. On that basis, the 
Court found that he was not subject to SDVCJ under VAWA 2013, so his 
attorney did not need to meet VAWA 2013 standards. Id. at 7. The Nation’s 
Supreme Court also held that the Nation had not violated equal protection 
by providing Petitioner with an attorney who was not admitted to a state 
bar. This difference in qualifications, they stated, was not “material or 
relevant.” Id. at 7. 
Following the Nation’s Supreme Court decision, Petitioner filed a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 
Rogers, alleging that his conviction violates the United States 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 
and VAWA 2013. Id. at 8. The District Court held that Petitioner is not 
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction because he does not have any 
“Indian blood.” Id. The court noted that the Nation exercised SDVCJ over 
Petitioner as a non-Indian, and they held that the Nation failed to provide 
Petitioner with sufficiently qualified defense counsel under VAWA 2013. 
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit reversed 
the District Court on the reasoning of the Nation’s Supreme Court. Id. at 9. 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide two 
issues: (1) whether Petitioner is a non-Indian for purposes of SDVCJ, and 
(2) whether Petitioner’s court-appointed attorney satisfied the relevant legal 
requirements. Id. at 10. 
Summary of Argument 
Petitioner, as a member of a federally recognized tribe, is Indian. The 
Nation properly exercised its powers of tribal government to enroll 
Petitioner in the tribe, and it afforded him all rights that apply to Indian 
defendants in court. While these rights may be different than those that a 
non-Indian defendant would enjoy in court, this does not amount to a 
violation of equal protection. 
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This case has important implications for tribal self-government. The 
Supreme Court has long recognized Indian tribes’ right to self-government 
in internal matters, such as tribal membership. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 
557 (1975); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222 (1897). Here, the Nation has 
appropriately exercised that right to proclaim Petitioner a citizen of the 
Nation and exercise jurisdiction over him based on his tribal citizenship. 
Petitioner seeks to overrule the tribe’s determination that he is Indian on 
the basis of his lack of “Indian blood.” But courts review Indian status on a 
case-by-case basis, and Indian blood is not a required element. St. Cloud v. 
United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 1988). Rather, tribal 
membership is the element that courts consistently rely on. Petitioner has 
satisfied that prong and is accordingly classified as Indian. 
Because Petitioner is Indian, it follows that he is not subject to SDVCJ 
under VAWA 2013. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to the expanded 
rights to counsel that VAWA 2013 provides. Because tribes are not bound 
by the Bill of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, Petitioner’s rights as a defendant are limited to those 
enumerated in the A.N.C. and ICRA. The Nation has fulfilled all of 
Petitioner’s A.N.C. and ICRA rights in this proceeding. 
While Petitioner contends that the Nation would be required to provide a 
non-Indian defendant with a state-licensed attorney, this does not amount to 
an equal protection violation under ICRA. Rights under ICRA are “similar, 
but not identical” to the rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Santa 
Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57. Because Petitioner has not suffered a 
significant injury due to the differentiation between Indians and non-
Indians, and because tribal practices could be significantly impaired by 
eliminating this distinction, the Court should not intrude on tribal self-
government by imposing a constitutional standard of equal protection on 
the Nation. Rather, it should defer to the Nation’s interpretation that the 
distinction does not violate equal protection. 
Even when applying a constitutional standard, there is no violation of 
equal protection. Tribes are political entities, so differentiation between 
Indians and non-Indians is not necessarily racial discrimination. See Morton 
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. 
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). Because the Nation’s distinction is 
based on political, not racial, status, the A.N.C.’s laws regarding indigent 
counsel for Indian and non-Indian defendants need only have a rational 
basis. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554. In this case, it is clear that the 
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distinction is rationally related to tribal self-government and preservation of 
tribal custom, and therefore should be upheld. 
Alternatively, if Petitioner is non-Indian, the Nation’s judgment should 
be upheld because it properly asserted its SDVCJ and satisfied its 
obligations regarding Petitioner’s right to counsel under VAWA 2013. 
Petitioner’s arguments rest on the assumption that VAWA 2013 requires 
that indigent counsel appointed to SDVCJ defendants are members in good 
standing of a state bar. In actuality, VAWA 2013 requires appointed 
counsel to be “licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United 
States that applies appropriate professional licensing standards and 
effectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its 
licensed attorneys.” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2). Petitioner’s attorney was 
licensed to practice law in the Amantonka Nation, a jurisdiction within the 
United States that administers a bar exam and ensures the competence of its 
licensed attorneys. Therefore, Petitioner’s counsel met the relevant legal 
requirements, whether or not he is Indian. 
Argument 
I. Petitioner’s Conviction Should Be Affirmed Because He Is Indian for 
Purposes of the Nation’s Criminal Jurisdiction and Its Courts Properly 
Declined to Exercise SDVCJ over Him 
Petitioner’s guilty conviction should stand because he is Indian for 
purposes of the Nation’s criminal jurisdiction, he has litigated this matter to 
finality within the Nation’s courts, and the proceedings did not violate his 
rights under ICRA. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized Indian tribes’ right to self-
government in internal matters, including tribal membership. See, e.g., 
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55; Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557; Roff, 168 
U.S. at 222. The Nation’s District Court and Supreme Court determined 
that Petitioner is Indian for purposes of its criminal jurisdiction because he 
is a naturalized citizen of the Nation. R. at 3, 6–7. Congress has not defined 
the term “Indian” for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. Tribal membership 
or citizenship is the most important factor for determining Indian status in 
U.S. federal courts, and it is also a matter of tribes’ internal self-
government. Petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the Nation, and therefore 
the Nation’s District Court properly determined that it had criminal 
jurisdiction over Petitioner, and did not err in declining to exercise its 
Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (“SDVCJ”) under 25 
U.S.C. § 1304. Even if Petitioner is held to be non-Indian, his guilty 
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conviction should stand because the Nation’s courts would have properly 
had SDVCJ over him, and the proceedings did not violate his rights under 
SDVCJ. 
A. Petitioner’s Proposed Definition of “Indian” Should Be Rejected 
Because It Ignores and Undermines the Nation’s Power to Confer 
Citizenship and Create Substantive Law on Internal Matters 
The Court should reject Petitioner’s contention that he is non-Indian and 
uphold the Nation’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction over him. Petitioner’s 
proposed “federal definition of ‘Indian,’” requiring that a person possess 
Indian blood in addition to being a member of an Indian tribe (R. at 7), 
would ignore and undermine the long-recognized power of tribes to confer 
citizenship and create substantive law on internal matters. Given the 
absence of a federal statutory definition of “Indian,” and the Court’s 
recognition of Indian tribes’ power to confer citizenship and self-govern 
internally and its adherence to the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, it should 
uphold the Nation’s judgment. 
1. There Is No Federal Statutory Definition of “Indian” for Purposes of 
Criminal Jurisdiction 
As the court recognized in St. Cloud, Congress has not defined the term 
“Indian” in its criminal statutes. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1460. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(4) provides that “Indian” means “any person who would be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, title 
18.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153 submits Indians who commit certain major crimes 
against other Indians in Indian country to exclusive federal jurisdiction, but 
does not define the term “Indian.” Indian status has been determined by 
courts on a case-by-case basis. See St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1460. 
Petitioner’s definition of “Indian” is one that courts have inferred from the 
Supreme Court’s Rogers decision, discussed below in Part I.B. Id.; United 
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572–73 (1846). As explained in Part I.B, the 
Court has determined that neither prong of the Rogers test for Indian status 
is dispositive. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646. 
2. Indian Tribes Have the Right to Self-Governance in Internal Matters, 
Including Tribal Membership or Citizenship 
On the other hand, the Court has declared Indian tribes such as the 
Nation to be “distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 
original natural rights” to govern themselves locally. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 
557; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55. Although no longer fully 
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sovereign nations, Indian tribes have been characterized by the Court as a 
“separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social 
relations.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–382 (1886). Courts 
have continued to apply the tribal sovereignty doctrine promulgated in 
Kagama to interpret federal statutes and treaties that could pose challenges 
to tribes’ rights to self-governance, resolving doubts in favor of Indian 
tribes. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 
164, 173 (1973) (holding that Arizona exceeded its authority by attempting 
to tax the income of a Navajo Indian). Given the absence of a federal 
statutory definition, and the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, the Court should 
hold that Indian status is a matter of internal tribal governance over which 
tribes may exercise their legislative and judicial authority. 
3. Tribal Citizenship Is a Matter of Internal Self-Governance and a 
Marker of Indian Status  
Courts have recognized that tribal citizenship is the most important 
indication of Indian status. In Roff, the Court acknowledged the Chickasaw 
Nation’s power to withdraw the tribal citizenship it had previously 
conferred onto a U.S. citizen because tribal citizenship was deemed an 
internal matter over which tribes could create their own substantive law. 
Roff, 168 U.S. at 222. Here, the Nation has exercised its power to confer 
citizenship onto Petitioner according to its naturalization process. 3 A.N.C. 
§§ 201–203. Relying on these authorities, the Court should uphold the 
Nation’s power to grant citizenship and exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
its citizens, including Petitioner. 
4. Petitioner Is a Citizen of the Nation and Is Therefore Subject to the 
Nation’s Laws and to the Jurisdiction of Its Courts  
Petitioner’s argument relies on the premise that a non-native, naturalized 
citizen cannot be Indian for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction. The 
Nation’s District Court rejected this premise, reasoning that it had 
jurisdiction over Petitioner because his decision to become a naturalized 
citizen was voluntary. R. at 6–7. The Supreme Court, in Nofire, similarly 
held that a U.S. citizen’s voluntary decision to become a citizen of the 
Cherokee Nation was sufficient to create jurisdiction for the Cherokee 
Nation’s courts over the defendant. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657, 
662 (1897). As an adult, Petitioner decided to apply for citizenship to the 
Nation based on his eligibility under 3 A.N.C. § 201. Petitioner fulfilled all 
of the requirements for naturalization listed in 3 A.N.C. § 202, including 
completing courses on the Nation’s culture, law, and government, and 
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passing the Nation’s citizenship test. Applying the reasoning in Nofire and 
above, the Court should uphold the Nation’s jurisdiction over Petitioner 
based on his tribal citizenship, which he has not given up. Petitioner should 
not be exempted from the Nation’s jurisdiction because he should not be 
able to enjoy the benefits of tribal citizenship without bearing its burdens. 
While the Court in Rogers held that a white man could not be considered 
Indian despite his adoption into the Cherokee Nation, Rogers has since been 
distinguished by the Ninth Circuit in Means, which instructs that tribal 
jurisdiction over Indians is based on tribal enrollment, not race. See Rogers, 
45 U.S. at 572–73; but see Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th 
Cir. 2005). The Means court applied the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mancari, which noted that the federal statutory recognition of Indian status 
in the context of the federal government’s Indian employment preferences 
is “political rather than racial in nature.” See Means, 432 F.3d at 932 (citing 
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554). Here, unlike in Mancari, there is no federal 
statutory definition of “Indian” for purposes of criminal jurisdiction in 
dispute. But as explained above, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty requires 
the Court to defer to the Nation’s determination as to the Indian status of its 
citizens. 
As an Indian, Petitioner is subject to the Nation’s criminal jurisdiction in 
this matter because tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over non-major crimes 
committed by Indians against Indians in Indian country, including the non-
felonious assaults listed in 18 U.S.C. § 113. Such crimes are specifically 
exempted from the exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes occurring in 
Indian country conferred by the General Crimes Act at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 
and the Major Crimes Act at 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
B. Even if the Federal Courts’ Test for Indian Status Controls, Petitioner 
Is an Indian Subject to the Nation’s Criminal Jurisdiction 
Even under the federal courts’ test for Indian status, Petitioner is Indian 
because he satisfies the test by virtue of his tribal enrollment. Courts’ 
reliance on the tribal enrollment prong of the test suggests that the other 
prong, which requires some degree of Indian blood, is not necessary. Since 
courts have held that tribal enrollment is sufficient to show Indian status, 
Petitioner’s Indian status should be affirmed. 
1. Neither the Blood Requirement nor the Tribal Membership Prong of 
the Rogers Test for Indian Status Is Dispositive 
The Court in Rogers held that a U.S. citizen could not become an Indian 
despite their adoption into the Cherokee Nation. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572–73. 
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While several courts read Rogers to imply a two-prong test for Indian status 
requiring that a person have Indian blood and tribal membership, the Court 
in Antelope explained that neither prong was dispositive. Id.; Antelope, 430 
U.S. at 646; see also, United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th 
Cir. 1979). The Antelope Court declared, “Indian blood alone is not enough 
to warrant federal criminal jurisdiction” because tribal jurisdiction over 
Indians in Indian country derives from a “special status of a formerly 
sovereign people,” not from an impermissible racial classification. 
Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646. It also noted that tribal enrollment “has not been 
held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 647. 
2. Meeting the Tribal Membership Prong of the Test Is Sufficient to Show 
Indian Status, and Courts Have Disregarded the Blood Requirement 
Since Rogers, courts have often relied on the tribal membership prong, at 
the exclusion of the blood requirement, to determine Indian status. For 
example, in Nofire, the Court upheld the Cherokee Nation’s jurisdiction 
over an adopted citizen of the Cherokee Nation on the basis of his tribal 
citizenship, even though he did not claim to have Indian ancestry. Nofire v. 
United States, 164 U.S. at 662. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, in Heath, 
relied on the failure of an anthropologically Klamath Indian to satisfy the 
tribal enrollment prong to hold him subject to state laws. United States v. 
Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974). Courts continue to consider the 
tribal enrollment prong to be “the common evidentiary means of 
establishing Indian status” even though it is not “necessarily 
determinative.” United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1984). 
While the St. Cloud court partly relied on evidence of Indian ancestry to 
find that defendant subject to tribal jurisdiction, it nonetheless recognized 
the long history of relying exclusively on the second prong of the Rogers 
test: “[O]n several occasions, courts have found tribal enrollment alone 
sufficient proof that a person is an Indian.” St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461. 
3. Since Petitioner Is a Citizen and Enrolled Member of the Nation, the 
Court Should Uphold the Nation’s Exercise of Jurisdiction over 
Petitioner 
It is undisputed that the Nation is a federally recognized tribe, and that 
Petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the Nation. R. at 6–7. The Nation’s 
code provides that the name of each new citizen is added to the Nation roll, 
which means that Petitioner is also an enrolled member of the Nation. 3 
A.N.C. § 203. In light of courts’ consistent reliance on the tribal enrollment 
prong of the Rogers test, over the blood requirement, the Court should hold 
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that Petitioner satisfies the federal test for Indian status and uphold the 
judgment of the Nation because its jurisdiction was proper in accordance 
with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153, and 113. 
C. Even if Petitioner Is Non-Indian, His Conviction Should Stand 
Because the Nation’s Courts Properly Had SDVCJ over Him, and the 
Proceedings Did Not Violate His Rights Under SDVCJ 
Even if the Court determines that Petitioner is not Indian, it should still 
affirm the judgment of the Nation’s court and the Thirteenth Circuit. 
Petitioner’s guilty conviction should be upheld even if he is not Indian 
because the Nation’s courts had proper grounds for jurisdiction under 
SDVCJ. 25 U.S.C. § 1304. SDVCJ extends tribal criminal jurisdiction to 
non-Indians who commit criminal acts of domestic violence against Indian 
victims in Indian country. 25 U.S.C. § 1304. Neither exception to SDVCJ 
described in 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4) applies to Petitioner because the victim 
in this case is Indian and Petitioner is a resident of the Nation, is employed 
in the Nation, and is the spouse of a member of the Nation. Further, the 
proceedings comported with all due protections owed to defendants under 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1302, as explained below in part IV. 
1. VAWA 2013 Authorizes Participating Tribes to Exercise Jurisdiction 
over Certain Domestic Violence Offenses Committed by a Non-Indian 
Against an Indian in Indian Country 
In United States v. Bryant, the Court recognized that Congress amended 
ICRA to authorize tribal courts to “exercise special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction” over certain domestic violence offenses committed by 
a non-Indian against an Indian, when it enacted VAWA 2013. United States 
v. Bryant, 136 S.Ct. 1954, 1960 (2016). This act of Congress modified the 
Court’s pronouncement in Oliphant that tribes generally lack criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian country. 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). Pursuant to the 
amendment, participating tribes may exercise their SDVCJ under 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1304 “over a defendant for criminal conduct that . . . [amounts to] . . . an 
act of domestic violence or dating violence that occurs in the Indian country 
of the participating tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c)(1). 
2. Petitioner’s Offense Falls Within the Meaning of “Domestic 
Violence” in VAWA 2013 
25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(2) provides that “domestic violence” may mean 
“violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of 
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the victim” or “by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated 
with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner.” Petitioner satisfies both of 
these alternative definitions. Petitioner is the victim’s spouse and he has 
cohabitated with the victim as such for a continuous period of at least two 
years. R. at 3–7. Petitioner struck his spouse across the face with “enough 
force to cause her to fall to the ground,” which is an act of violence. R. at 6. 
Further, Petitioner’s action is a non-felonious assault in a special territorial 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 113. Petitioner’s offense against his spouse, a 
member of the Nation, is therefore a criminal act of domestic violence 
within the meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 1304, and is subject to the Nation’s 
jurisdiction. 
3. Neither One of VAWA 2013’s Exceptions to Tribes’ Authorization to 
Exercise SDVCJ over Non-Indians Applies to Petitioner 
25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4) provides two exceptions to SDVCJ, but neither 
exception applies to Petitioner. The first exception prevents tribes from 
exercising SDVCJ over defendants when the victim and defendant are both 
non-Indian. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(A). The second exception prevents 
tribes from exercising SDVCJ over defendants who lack sufficient ties to 
the tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B). Petitioner does not qualify for the first 
exception because the victim, his spouse, is indisputably Indian. Further, 
Petitioner’s ties to the Nation are too strong to exempt him from jurisdiction 
under the section exception. Therefore, if the Court considers Petitioner to 
be non-Indian, then the Nation has a proper basis to assert SDVCJ over him 
because the offense qualifies and neither exception applies. 
The first exception at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(A) does not apply here 
because there is no dispute that the victim in this case, Petitioner’s spouse 
Lorinda, was a citizen and enrolled member of the Nation from the time 
that she met Petitioner until now. R. at 6–7. The Nation’s district court 
found both defendant and victim to be Indian. Id. at 3. Whether the Court 
accepts Respondents’ or Petitioner’s proposed definition of “Indian,” 
Petitioner does not contest his spouse’s Indian status in this matter. 
Therefore, the Court should accept the Nation’s determination of the 
victim’s Indian status as an undisputed fact. 
The second exception at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) does not apply 
because Petitioner has sufficient ties to the Nation to justify its exercise of 
SDVCJ over him. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) provides three alternative 
bases for finding sufficient ties to exercise SDVCJ over a defendant. While 
Petitioner may satisfy all three alternative bases because it seems that he 
still resides and works in the Nation (R. at 6), he definitely satisfies the 
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third basis for exercising SDVCJ. The third basis at 25 U.S.C. § 
1304(b)(4)(B)(iii) permits tribes to exercise SDVCJ over a defendant who 
“is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of—(I) a member of the 
participating tribe; or (II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the 
participating tribe.” The record shows that Petitioner is the spouse of a 
member of the Nation who currently resides in the Nation. R. at 3–7. 
Petitioner therefore has sufficient ties to the Nation to be subject to its 
SDVCJ even if he is non-Indian, and he cannot avail himself of either 
exception to the Nation’s SDVCJ. 
II. Because Petitioner Is an Indian Defendant Sentenced to Less Than a 
Year in Prison, His Court-Appointed Attorney Satisfies the Relevant Legal 
Requirements 
Petitioner’s court-appointed attorney satisfies all relevant legal 
requirements. The Nation is not bound under the Constitution to provide 
Petitioner with court-appointed counsel. Additionally, because Petitioner is 
Indian, as discussed above, and his prison sentence is less than one year, he 
is not eligible for appointed counsel of any qualification under VAWA 
2013 or ICRA. The Nation has fulfilled their obligations under the A.N.C. 
to provide Petitioner with a sufficiently qualified public defender. 
A. Petitioner Has No Constitutional Right to Counsel 
The Supreme Court has long held that “the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes.” 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); see also 
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382–385 (1896). Tribes are therefore not 
bound by the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, and uncounseled 
tribal convictions are even valid for use as predicate offenses in later 
sentencing. See Bryant, 136 U.S. at 1958–1959. Thus, under the 
Constitution alone, the Nation was not required to provide any counsel to 
Petitioner, let alone an attorney admitted to the state bar. 
B. Petitioner Is Not Eligible for Expanded Rights to Counsel Under 
VAWA 2013 Because He Is Indian 
While VAWA 2013 extends rights to appointed counsel to certain tribal 
court defendants, Petitioner is not eligible for these rights. Under VAWA 
2013, Indian tribes exercising SDVCJ are required, inter alia, to (1) 
“provide to the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel at least 
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” (2) “provide an 
indigent defendant the assistance of a defense attorney licensed to practice 
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law by any jurisdiction in the United States that applies appropriate 
professional licensing standards and effectively ensures the competence and 
professional responsibility of its licensed attorneys,” and (3) provide “all 
other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the 
United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent 
power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d). 
As Petitioner is Indian, the SDVCJ rights do not apply to him. Pursuant 
to 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6), “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” 
is defined as “the criminal jurisdiction that a participating tribe may 
exercise under this section but could not otherwise exercise.” Tribes’ 
sovereign power has always included the ability to prosecute and punish 
tribal members in tribal court. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 
323 (1978). Congress has also recognized tribes’ inherent power to 
prosecute nonmember Indian defendants. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193, 199 (2004). Therefore, even if VAWA 2013 had never been enacted, 
the Nation would be able to exercise jurisdiction over an Indian defendant. 
Because Petitioner is an Indian tribal member, the Nation’s jurisdiction 
does not derive from VAWA 2013, and he is therefore not subject to 
SDVCJ and not eligible for the expanded rights it affords. 
C. Petitioner Is Not Eligible for Expanded Rights to Counsel Under 
ICRA Because His Prison Sentence Is Less Than One Year 
While tribes are not bound by the United States Constitution, ICRA 
established an Indian Bill of Rights that is “similar, but not identical” to the 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57. 
Notably, ICRA’s Bill of Rights does not include a right to court-appointed 
counsel analogous to the Sixth Amendment. Rather, the comparable clause 
in ICRA states that a defendant has a right to assistance of counsel “at his 
own expense.” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
However, ICRA does afford expanded rights to indigent defendants who 
are sentenced “a total term of imprisonment of more than 1 year.” 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(c). These rights include two of those also provided to 
SDVCJ defendants, namely “the right to effective assistance of counsel at 
least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” and 
“assistance of a defense attorney licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction 
in the United States that applies appropriate professional licensing 
standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional 
responsibility of its licensed attorneys.” Id. But as long as the court imposes 
a sentence less than one year, the defendant is not entitled to these rights. 
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Petitioner is not eligible for expanded rights to appointed counsel under 
ICRA. Petitioner’s term of imprisonment is seven months, which is less 
than one year. The Nation is thus not required under federal law to provide 
him with an attorney, state-licensed or not.  
D. Petitioner’s Counsel Met the Relevant Requirements Under the 
A.N.C. 
Petitioner’s counsel met the relevant requirements under the A.N.C. 
Although tribes are not required by the Constitution or ICRA to provide 
indigent Indian defendants with counsel if they are sentenced to less than a 
year of imprisonment, the Nation nonetheless provides appointed counsel to 
all indigent defendants. Under the A.N.C., indigent defense counsel 
appointed to Indian defendants are not required to have a JD degree from an 
ABA accredited law school, nor are they required to be licensed to practice 
before a state or federal court. 2 A.N.C. § 503(2), 607(a). Petitioner does 
not contend that his attorney was unqualified under Title 2 Sec. 607(a), and 
the Nation therefore provided him with appropriately qualified counsel. 
III. Distinguishing Between Indian Defendants and Non-Indian Defendants 
for the Purposes of Appointing Indigent Defense Counsel Does Not Violate 
Equal Protection Under ICRA 
Petitioner’s contention that the Nation denied him equal protection 
because a non-Indian defendant would have been appointed a state-licensed 
attorney is erroneous. Indian tribes are not bound by the Fifth or the 
Fourteenth Amendment to provide a right of equal protection. Hicks, 533 
U.S. at 383. Under federal law, any tribal obligations of equal protection 
arise from ICRA, which states that Indian tribes may not “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any 
person of liberty or property without due process of law.” 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(a)(8). 
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court recognized the importance of allowing 
tribal courts, rather than federal courts, to interpret equal protection under 
ICRA. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67. In this particular case, where 
tribal self-determination is at stake, the Court should defer to the Nation’s 
interpretation that it has not violated equal protection. However, even under 
a constitutional standard, the Nation has not violated equal protection 
because its laws related to appointment of counsel do not discriminate 
based on race and serve a rational purpose. 
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A. Equal Protection Under ICRA Should Be Interpreted Differently from 
the Fourteenth Amendment and in Favor of the Nation 
It is a fundamental principle of federal Indian law that tribes are 
“unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as 
limitations on federal or state authority.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 
56; see also Talton, 163 U.S. at 382–385. Thus, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, requiring the federal and state governments to provide equal 
protection, do not apply to Indian tribes. When interpreting the Indian Bill 
of Rights under ICRA, courts have recognized that ICRA rights often 
depart from their constitutional counterparts. In particular, ICRA rights may 
be interpreted differently in order to preserve tribal practices and fulfill 
Congress’ intent of exempting Indian tribes from certain constitutional 
provisions. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976). In this case, both 
of those interests are at stake, so the Court should defer to the Nation’s 
interpretation of equal protection rather than applying a constitutional 
standard. 
1. Equal Protection Under ICRA Should Be Interpreted with Regard for 
Tribal Customs and Self-Government 
While ICRA’s equal protection clause is worded similarly to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, lower courts have historically recognized that, in 
contrast to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, equal 
protection under ICRA is interpreted with “due regard for the historical, 
governmental and cultural values of an Indian tribe.” Tom, 533 F.2d at 1101 
n.5; see also Howlett v. The Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th 
Cir. 1976); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971). The Sixth 
Circuit has also cited tribal court decisions cautioning that tribes “have 
formulated their own notions of due process and equal protection in 
compliance with both aboriginal and modern tribal laws” and that “courts 
should not simply rely on ideas of due process rooted in the Anglo–
American system and then attempt to apply these concepts to tribal 
governments as if they were states or the federal government.” United 
States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1997). 
For this reason, the Court recognized in Santa Clara Pueblo that federal 
review of tribal court interpretations of equal protection should be heavily 
limited. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71. In that case, the plaintiff 
argued that the Santa Clara Pueblo violated equal protection by granting 
tribal membership to children of men who married outside the tribe, but not 
to those of women. Id. at 51. Holding that there was no federal remedy for 
alleged ICRA violations beyond habeas corpus relief, the Court emphasized 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss2/8
No. 2] SPECIAL FEATURE 505 
 
 
the need to protect tribal self-government and avoid undue incursions on 
tribal sovereignty, even when the tribe’s actions might violate equal 
protection if constitutional limitations applied. Id. at 71. 
Since Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court has had few opportunities to clarify 
the meaning of equal protection under ICRA, but its guidance in that 
decision is still instructive. The Court reasoned in Santa Clara Pueblo that 
“resolution of statutory issues under § 1302…will frequently depend on 
questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a 
better position to evaluate than federal courts.” Id. at 71. Further, the Court 
noted that ICRA served dual purposes: (1) to “[strengthen] the position of 
individual tribal members vis-a-vis the tribe,” and (2) “to promote the well-
established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’” Id. at 62. 
The Court cautioned against interpretations of ICRA that would advance 
the first objective while hindering Indian self-government. Id. 
To limit incursions into tribal self-government, the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits have all adopted a test that extends the federal constitutional 
standard of equal protection to a tribe only when a tribal practice mirrors a 
practice “commonly employed” in non-tribal jurisdictions. See White Eagle 
v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973); Randall v. Yakima 
Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1988); Kelsey v. Pope, 809 
F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016). But where a constitutional standard would 
“significantly impair a tribal practice or alter a custom firmly embedded in 
Indian culture, and where the individual injury alleged by the tribal member 
is, by comparison, not a grievous one,” then Courts have allowed tribal 
courts to depart from the constitutional standard of equal protection and 
uphold tribal laws that differentiate between protected groups. Howlett, 529 
F.2d at 238. 
The cases where lower courts found that tribal practices were sufficiently 
similar to those employed elsewhere in the United States have typically 
involved tribal election procedures. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
extended a constitutional standard of equal protection to the Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes because their election procedures “[paralleled] those 
commonly found in our culture.” Id. This is consistent with previous 
decisions that when no traditional tribal practices are at stake, courts have 
been comfortable imposing a federal constitutional standard on the tribe. 
See, e.g., One Feather, 478 F.2d at 1314. 
On its face, the present case appears similar to Howlett, in that the Nation 
has adopted procedures, like appointment of indigent defense counsel and a 
tribal bar examination, that mirror those commonly found in the states. But 
this case can be distinguished from Howlett and similar lower court 
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decisions. While the Nation has taken a page out of the states’ book in 
appointing indigent defense counsel, it has adapted this procedure in a way 
that specifically preserves tribal custom. For example, the Nation has 
avoided requiring its public defenders to pass the state bar and requires 
public defenders for Indian defendants to have training in Amantonka law 
and culture. Through these provisions, the Nation specifically preserves 
Amantonka values and traditions in their courts. 
Moreover, while the bar examination is common practice in the United 
States, tribal law does not necessarily mirror state or federal law. Rather, 
tribal courts “differ from traditional American courts in a number of 
significant respects.” Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring). 
Therefore, a tribal bar examination testing tribal law is not sufficiently 
equivalent to a state bar examination, which tests an entirely different body 
and tradition of law. 
Moreover, unlike in Howlett and its brethren, imposing a requirement 
that the Nation appoint defendants with counsel who have passed state bar 
examinations would impair tribal practice. Requiring all attorneys in tribal 
court to pass a state bar exam would not only “impose… a great cost on 
tribes,” it would also put tribes under “pressure to conform their systems to 
match federal or state justice systems.” ICRA Reconsidered: New 
Interpretations of Familiar Rights, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1709, 1717 (2016). 
The Nation has a compelling interest in determining the structure of its 
judicial system independent of the requirements imposed in states. It can 
support this interest by training its lawyers and advocates in the Nation’s 
traditional body of law, untainted by the law of other sovereigns. 
Even when a tribal practice would be impaired, the Howlett test still 
requires the court to balance that harm against the injury suffered by the 
defendant. Howlett, 529 F.2d at 238. In this case, any alleged differentiation 
between non-Indians and Indians did not cause Petitioner to suffer injury. 
As the Nation’s Supreme Court recognized, Petitioner has “not pointed to 
any errors allegedly committed by his defense counsel.” R. at 7. Even 
though his attorney was not a member of a state bar, the Court’s standard 
for effective assistance of counsel does not depend on bar admission. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of 
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the 
like…are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only 
guides.”). 
Petitioner makes no argument that his attorney did not provide effective 
assistance of counsel. The Court employs a two-prong test to determine 
whether assistance of counsel was effective: The defendant must show that 
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(1) his defense counsel’s professional judgment was unreasonable; and (2) 
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for his 
attorney’s unreasonable acts. Id. at 691–694. Petitioner does not contend 
that his attorney’s judgment was unreasonable, nor that the outcome of his 
case would be different had he been appointed a state-licensed attorney. 
Therefore, he has not suffered any injury that would have been abated had 
the Nation appointed him a state-licensed attorney. Moreover, the Court 
recently held that uncounseled tribal convictions are valid; it should not 
now hold that providing counsel without state credentials amounts to such a 
grievous injury that it warrants an incursion into tribal self-government. 
Bryant, 136 S.Ct. at 1963. 
Further, the Nation’s Supreme Court’s determination that the difference 
in qualifications was not relevant for providing adequate counsel is a 
logical conclusion. There is no reason why knowledge of state law should 
be relevant when representing a client in a court that applies tribal law. 
Accordingly, it is not only true that Petitioner was not harmed by this 
differentiation, it is also unlikely that future defendants will be harmed by 
the Nation’s distinction. Thus, given the lack of injury to Petitioner, and the 
strong tribal interest in determining its own judicial structure and customs, 
the Court should uphold the Nation’s Code provisions regarding right to 
counsel.  
2. Because Congress Specifically Intended for Tribes to Not Be Bound by 
the Sixth Amendment When Enacting ICRA, the Court Should Not Apply 
a Standard of Equal Protection That Would Bind Tribes by the Sixth 
Amendment 
While goals of tribal self-government alone warrant a departure from the 
constitutional standard of equal protection in this case, so too does the 
Congressional history of ICRA’s right to counsel provision. Because non-
Indian defendants are entitled to “effective assistance of counsel at least 
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” Petitioner’s 
request to be afforded the same rights as a non-Indian defendant amounts to 
a request to bind tribes by the Sixth Amendment in most cases of domestic 
violence. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1); § 1304(d)(2). 
But the plain language and legislative history of ICRA both show that 
Congress did not intend to bind tribes by the Sixth Amendment. Tom, 533 
F.2d at 1104. As discussed above, the plain language of ICRA says that a 
defendant is only entitled to assistance of counsel at “his own expense.” 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(c)(6). The original bill introduced in Congress imposed on 
tribes “the same limitations and restraints as those which are imposed on 
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the Government of the United States by the United States Constitution.” 
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 75 (White, J., dissenting), quoting S. 961, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). But there were objections to such broad 
language, and it was removed. Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 681. The Senate 
Subcommittee specifically noted that the final bill carved out exceptions so 
that certain constitutional limitations did not apply to Indian tribes, 
including “certain of the procedural requirements of the 5th, 6th, and 7th 
amendments, and, in some respects, the equal protection requirement of the 
14th amendment.” Id. at 682. 
It would be contradictory if Congress, on the one hand, intended to 
exempt Indian tribes from the Sixth Amendment, and on the other hand, 
intended to bind Indian tribes by the Sixth Amendment via ICRA’s equal 
protection clause. The Ninth Circuit similarly refused to extend a 
constitutional standard of due process to tribes where such a standard would 
conflict with Congress’ legislative intent that the tribes not be required to 
provide indigent counsel in tribal courts. Tom, 533 F.2d at 1104. The Court 
reasoned that Congress could not have intended due process under ICRA to 
be co-extensive with constitutional due process, since doing so would 
require tribes to appoint indigent defense counsel in contradiction of 
Congress’ intent. Id. Analogously, equal protection under ICRA should not 
be held to be co-extensive with its constitutional counterpart where the 
implication would be binding tribes by the Sixth Amendment.  
B. Even if Equal Protection Under ICRA Is Co-Extensive with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Tribe’s Appointment of Defense Counsel 
Does Not Violate Equal Protection Because Tribal Identity Is Political 
and the Requirement Has a Rational Basis 
Even analyzing this case under a constitutional standard of equal 
protection, the Court should nonetheless come to the same conclusion that 
equal protection has not been violated. Where a distinction is based on 
racial classification, the government must show under strict scrutiny that 
the distinction is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental 
interest. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986). By 
contrast, distinctions based on a political classification are subject only to 
rational review. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553–54; see also Antelope, 430 
U.S. at 646. Under this standard, the government must show that the 
distinction is “reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-
government.” Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. Because the Nation’s distinction is 
based on Indian status, which is a political classification, it is subject to 
rational review. Upon such review, the Court should hold that the Nation’s 
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distinction serves a rational purpose of preserving an independent tribal 
judicial system. 
1. The Nation’s Distinction Between Indians and Non-Indians Is Based 
on a Political, Not Racial, Classification 
Indian status is a political classification that derives from the Indian 
tribes’ unique status as “quasi-sovereign…entities.” Mancari, 417 U.S. at 
554. In Mancari, the Court addressed the question of whether a hiring 
preference that favored Indians for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. Holding that it 
did not, the unanimous majority reasoned that the preference did not apply 
to Indians as a racial group, but rather to members of quasi-sovereign 
entities who had a unique interest in their own affairs and government. Id. 
at 554. 
In Antelope, the Court extended the holding of Mancari to the criminal 
context. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646. The Indian defendants in Antelope were 
charged with first-degree murder in federal court. Id. at 642. Non-Indian 
defendants would have been prosecuted in state court, under a more 
favorable law that would have added a burden on the prosecution to prove 
premeditation and deliberation. Id. at 644. In another unanimous decision, 
the Court held that the law subjecting Indians to federal jurisdiction did not 
violate equal protection because “respondents were not subjected to federal 
criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they 
are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.” Id. at 646.  
In the case before the Court, the Nation’s distinction between Indians 
and non-Indians is similarly a political classification. Perhaps the most 
obvious evidence that this distinction is not racial is Petitioner’s case itself. 
The Court need not decide whether a distinction between Indians and non-
Indians based on race alone would violate equal protection because that 
question is not before the Court in this case. The fact that the Nation 
considers Petitioner to be Indian for purposes of providing defense counsel 
clearly shows that their distinction is not based on race.  
2. The Nation’s Distinction Between Indians and Non-Indians Has a 
Rational Purpose of Promoting Tribal Self-Government 
Because the Nation’s distinction is based on a political classification 
rather than race, it must only survive rational review. The “rational tie” 
standard, as defined in the context of Indian law, requires that any 
distinctions based on Indian status in federal law must be “tied rationally to 
the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indian.” Mancari, 
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417 U.S. at 555. In Mancari, the BIA’s hiring preference for Indians was 
“reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government” 
because it allowed more tribal members to be involved in decisions that 
would affect their communities. Id. 
The Court also extended this system of review to certain state laws. In 
Yakima, the Yakama Nation challenged a state statute that granted the state 
full jurisdiction over fee lands, but limited jurisdiction over non-fee lands. 
Wash. v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 
U.S. 463, 475 (1979). The Yakama Nation contended that the State’s statute 
violated equal protection by denying law enforcement benefits to Indians 
living on non-fee lands, while providing it to Indians on fee lands. 
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. State of Wash., 
552 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977). The Court upheld Washington’s 
“checkerboard” jurisdiction, finding that it did not violate equal protection 
under the Constitution because the statute was “fairly calculated to further 
the State’s interest in providing protection to non-Indian citizens living 
within the boundaries of a reservation while at the same time allowing 
scope for tribal self-government on trust or restricted lands.” Yakima, 439 
U.S. at 502. The distinction between fee lands and non-fee lands was 
rational because it prevented the State from intervening in places where 
“tribal members have the greatest interest in being free of state police 
power.” Id. 
Similarly, the Nation’s distinction between Indians and non-Indians is 
rationally calculated to afford the Nation the greatest possible self-
determination while still meeting any obligations to non-Indians under 
VAWA 2013. As discussed above, the Nation has a strong interest in 
preserving traditional tribal law and establishing a judicial system that is 
independent from state court procedures. Where the Nation is not 
constrained by federal law, it has fulfilled this interest by requiring that its 
public defenders are trained in Amantonka law, but not in the laws of the 
state governments. 
The Nation nonetheless recognizes that, under VAWA 2013, it must 
provide additional protections to non-Indian citizens. This distinction is 
rational not only because tribes are specifically mandated by Congress 
under VAWA to provide certain protections to non-Indians, but also 
because non-Indian citizens do not have the same interest as Indians in 
preserving tribal traditions. See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. 
Thornburgh. 922 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991). In this case, Petitioner 
and other members of the Nation have a unique interest in going through a 
tribal judicial system that maintains tribal procedures, free from state 
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interference. Non-Indians, on the other hand, do not have a similar interest. 
Similar to Washington’s distinction in Yakima, the Nation’s distinction 
between Indians and non-Indians is therefore rational because citizens of a 
sovereign tribe have a greater interest than non-Indians in being free from 
state and federal interference and preserving traditions of tribal law.  
IV. Even if Petitioner Is Non-Indian, His Attorney Nonetheless Meets the 
SDVCJ Standards 
Even if Petitioner is non-Indian, his attorney meets SDVCJ standards. 
First, Petitioner’s attorney was admitted to practice law before the Nation’s 
courts, meaning that his attorney is appropriately classified as counsel. See 
United States v. Long, 870 F.3d 741, 748 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
defendant was not denied a right to counsel because his attorney was a lay 
advocate, rather than a state-licensed attorney). As discussed above, 
Petitioner’s counsel provided effective assistance at least equal to that 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, as defined in Strickland. 
Second, the Nation appointed Petitioner “a defense attorney licensed to 
practice law by [a] jurisdiction in the United States that applies appropriate 
professional licensing standards and effectively ensures the competence and 
professional responsibility of its licensed attorneys.” 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(c)(2). Third, as previously discussed, the Nation has not violated 
equal protection under the Constitution, and Petitioner does not contend 
that any of his other constitutional rights have been denied. 
Petitioner claims that his counsel does not meet these qualifications 
because his attorney was not licensed to practice in any state. Petitioner has 
construed “licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction in the United States” 
to mean “licensed to practice law in federal or state courts,” but this is not 
apparent from the statute. Tribal judicial systems are jurisdictions within 
the United States, and as such they fall within the plain meaning of the 
statute. Elsewhere in the statute, Congress refers to “Federal or State 
criminal jurisdiction” or otherwise refers to the “the authority of the United 
States or any State government. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(3). The fact that 
Congress did not specify that Petitioner’s court-appointed attorney needed 
to be licensed in a federal or state jurisdiction implies that an attorney 
licensed in a tribal jurisdiction in the United States satisfies the VAWA 
requirements. 
Further, by administering a tribal bar exam, the Nation “applies 
appropriate professional licensing standards and effectively ensures the 
competence and professional responsibility of its licensed attorneys.” 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2). Petitioner has not specified any flaws in the tribal bar 
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exam that prove otherwise. Beyond the bar exam, the Nation ensures the 
continued competence and professional responsibility of its attorneys by 
establishing a Code of Ethics and providing for disbarment upon violation 
of that Code. See 2 A.N.C. § 504(a); 2 A.N.C. ch. 7. 
Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney meets the requirements to represent a non-
Indian defendant under 2 A.N.C. § 607(b). Petitioner’s attorney possessed a 
Juris Doctor degree from an ABA-accredited law school and had 
successfully completed the Nation’s bar exam. R. at 7. Petitioner has not 
asserted that his counsel did not take an oath of office or pass a background 
check. Therefore, Petitioner’s lawyer satisfied the relevant requirements 
whether or not Petitioner is Indian. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit and hold that (1) 
Petitioner is Indian, (2) the Nation accordingly had criminal, but not special 
domestic violence criminal, jurisdiction over him, and (3) the Nation 
provided Petitioner with a properly qualified attorney under all relevant 
laws and did not violate equal protection in doing so. 
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